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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we consider the problem of resource congestion control for competing online learning
agents. On the basis of non-cooperative game as the model for the interaction between the agents,
and the noisy online mirror ascent as the model for rational behaviour of the agents, we propose
a novel pricing mechanism which gives the agents incentives for sustainable use of the resources.
Our mechanism is distributed and resource-centric, in the sense that it is done by the resources
themselves and not by a centralized instance, and that it is based rather on the congestion state of
the resources than the preferences of the agents. In case that the noise is persistent, and for several
choices of the intrinsic parameter of the agents, such as their learning rate, and of the mechanism
parameters, such as the learning rate of -, the progressivity of the price-setters, and the extrinsic price
sensitivity of the agents, we show that the accumulative violation of the resource constraints of the
resulted iterates is sub-linear w.r.t. the time horizon. Moreover, we provide numerical simulations
to support our theoretical findings.
1 Introduction
Online Mirror Descent - Rationality in the Face of Unknown: Online learning has become an important concept
for real-time decision making in an unknown environment, and has led to several efficient methods in widespread
applications (e.g. see [1, 2]). Its process can be formulated as follows: at each time t, a learner selects an action xt from
a set X and suffers the loss ft(xt) specified by a function ft : X → R apriori unknown to her. By means of additional
information about the environment state, such as the gradient of ft, the learner chooses her next action with the aim
of minimizing her loss. The quality of a learning policy is measured by its regret Regt := maxx∈X
∑t
τ=1[fτ (x) −
fτ (Xτ )] and a satisfactory one is characterized by the no-regret property (see e.g. [3, 4, 5]), i.e. sub-linear decay of
its regret with time. The canonical and widely used class of no-regret policy in the presence of first-order oracle is the
so-called online mirror descent (OMD) [6], known also in other literature as dual averaging [7]. The iterate of OMD
consists of averaging process of the obtained first-order information giving the score vector, and subsequent mirror
step realizing the score in the action space X .
Game Theory - Competition in an Online Environment: As has already been recognized in [8], the concept of
online learning can serve as a paradigm to describe the decision making process of rational agents in a non-cooperative
game (NG). NG is a popular model, not only for economics - and social perspectives, but also for vast number of real-
world technical applications (see also [9]), especially in those where cooperation between system participants is hard
to establish, such as smart grid [10, 11, 12, 13, 14], networked system [15], or in general large-scale complex systems
(e.g. those which emerge within the framework of internet of things), where cooperation between system participants
is hard to establish. The typical setting of NG is as follows: the reward u(x
(i)
t , x
(−i)
t ) of each agent i obtained in a
time slot t depends on both, her action x
(i)
t and the action others x
(−i)
t . To model the non-cooperativeness aspect, the
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latter is assumed to be not visible apriori for agent i. Thus her reward can be expressed as u
(i)
t (x
(i)
t ) where u
(i)
t is an
apriori unknown function. This justifies the assumption of competitive rational agents as online learners.
Resource Constraints: In widespread practical applications, the action of the agents is additionally related to the
utilization of certain limited resources. For example: in the network applications, the user’s (agents) choice of data
transfer paths (strategy) increases the congestion of certain links and routers (resources) with limited capacity; In
electric mobility, the vehicles’ (agents) charge policy (strategy) increases the load of a grid, having limited electrical
power (resource), at certain times [16]. An important issue which has to be dealt by a system designer and - manager is
the danger of resource overload due to agents’ egoistic behaviour, because the state of overutilization of resources can
caused immense degradation of the overall system performance (see e.g. the problem of congestion and congestion
collapse in networked system [17]) and negative environmental issues (e.g. caused by high CO2 emissions of electrical
energy driven resources). Another example of events justifying the importance of sustainability aspect in a system of
egoistic optimizing agents is the flash crash in US financial markets due to fully automated computerized trading (see
e.g. [18]).
Problem Description: This work addresses the problem of how to avoid or at least alleviate resource congestion in a
system consisting of selfish online learning agents in competitive environment. A challenge associated with this issue
is to design a congestion control method which demands as few information about agents’ characteristics as possible.
The reason is that the methods contrary to the latter requirement would need, in case the number of agents is large,
exceptionally high computational power for the processing of the obtained information. Moreover, such methods
would be inflexible for possible exit of - and entrance of new agents and therefore unsuitable for modern systems such
as IoT.
Our Contribution: Align with the postulated requirement, we provide a novel price-based congestion control method
aiming to give incentives to egoistic OMD-applying agents for sustainable use of resources. The pricing is based on
the congestion state of the resources and is done by the resources themselves rather than by a centralized instance.
Furthermore, we provide sub-linear bound for the cumulative violation of the resource constraints and decaying bound
for the violation of the constraints made by ergodic average of the population action. We are not aware of a comparable
control methods in the learning literature, since it either focuses on the behaviour of a single learner or hides further
possible influence of learners’ decisions to certain scarce resources. Also, we are not aware of similar non-asymptotic
focus on the resource aware behaviour in the game theory literature.
Relation to prior works One of the closest works to ours is [19]. There, an analysis of OMD with noisy feedback for
NG with continuous action set is given. Several interesting extensions of this work have been made: The work [20]
extends the analysis for cases where the utility functions of the agents are time variant, and [21] for cases where the
feedback received by the agents is delayed. In contrast to [19], we consider NG which underly in addition resource
constraints. Our focus is not on the stability of the population dynamic, but but rather on the resource constraints
awareness. Another works closely related to ours are works which focus on algorithmically finding generalized Nash
equilibrium. The most recent one is [22]. Based on a fixed-point method for finding the solution of a variational
inequality (see e.g. Chapter 12 in [23]), a Euclidean projection-based semi-decentralized algorithm converging to a
state fulfilling coupled resource constraints are fulfilled. In contrast to our result, their results are purely of asymptotic
nature, i.e. there is no guarantee for the population behaviour in the finite time.
2 Model Description and Preliminaries
Basic notations: For a ∈ N, we denote [a] := {1, . . . , a} and [a]0 = [a] ∪ {0}. For a convex subset A ⊆ RD ,
relint(A) denotes the relative interior of A. The projection onto a closed convex subset A of RD is denoted by
ΠA. The dual norm of a norm ‖ · ‖ on RD is denoted by ‖ · ‖∗. F : RD → RD is said to be monotone on Z if
〈x1 − x2, F (x1)− F (x2)〉 ≤ 0, for all x1, x2 ∈ Z . If in the latter strict inequality hold for x1 6= x2, then F is said to
be strictly monotone. F is said to be c-strongly monotone on Z if 〈x1 − x2, F (x1) − F (x2)〉 ≤ −c‖x1 − x2‖2, for
all x1, x2 ∈ Z .
2.1 Continuous Game with Coupled Resource Constraints
Continuous Non-Cooperative Game: We consider throughout this work a finite set [N ] of agents playing a (repeated)
non-cooperative game (NG) Γ. During the NG, every agent i ∈ [N ] chooses and applies an action/strategy x(i) from a
non-empty compact convex subset Xi of a finite-dimensional normed space (RDi , ‖ · ‖i). This process results in joint
action/strategy-profile x = (x(1), . . . , x(N)) ∈ X := ∏Ni=1 Xi ∈ RD, where D := ∑Ni=1Di. In order to highlight
the action of player i, we write x = (x(i), x(−i)) where x(−i) = (x(j))j 6=i ∈ X−i :=
∏
j 6=i Xj . Suppose that the
2
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population action at time t is xt ∈ X . The payoff/reward agent i received after xt is given by ui(x(i)t , x(−i)t ), where
ui : X → R is a coordinate-wise concave and continuously differentiable function.
Coupled Resource Constraints: For a certain number R > 0 of resources, we model the relation between agents’
action and resource utilization circumstance is modeled by an affine function φ = (φ1, . . . , φR) : RD → RR, x 7→
Ax − b, where A := [A1, . . . ,AN ] ∈ RR×D with Ai ∈ RM×Di , ∀i ∈ [N ], specifies the resource load caused
by a population’s action, and where b ∈ RR describes the capacity of resources. Correspondingly, φr(x) gives the
overload/congestion state of the resource r ∈ [R] caused by the population action x. Since from operational - and
sustainability point of view overload has to be kept low and even avoided, it is desired that the population strategy is
contained in Q := C ∩ X , where C := {φ(x) ≤ 0}. In order that this goal is feasible, we assume that C is non-empty.
A sufficient condition leading to the latter circumstance is the following:
Assumption 1 (Slater’s condition): There exists x∗ ∈ relint(X ) s.t. φ(x∗) < 0.
This sort of constraint is a subclass of the so called coupled constraint, where the compliance depends on the strategy
not only of a single agent but also of the whole population.
2.2 Basic Agents’ Behaviour in the Repeated NG
First-Order Feedback with Martingale Noise Let be i ∈ [N ]. Suppose that in the time slot t the agents [N ] \ {i}
has applied the action x
(−i)
t ∈ X−i. To improve her payoff, agent i may use (if available) her individual utility
gradient:
vi((·), x(−i)t ) : Xi → RDi , x(i)t 7→ ∇x(i)t ui(x
(i)
t , x
(−i)
t ),
and go along the direction of steepest ascent of her utility function. However, perfect first-order feedback is in general
hard to obtain, especially without explicit knowledge of the utility function. Thus, we include in our model the
possibility that agent i has only access to noisy first-order oracle rather than a perfect one. Specifically, we assume that
at each time t and for a given actionXt ∈ X , agent i can query an estimate of vˆ(i)t of vi(Xt) satisfyingE[‖vˆ(i)t ‖∗] <∞
and E[vˆ
(i)
t |Ft] = vi(Xt), where Ft is an element of a filtration F := (Ft)t∈N0 on a probability space (Ω,Σ,P), which
we assume throughout this work to be given. The canonical and commonly-used filtration in the literature is the
filtration of the history of the considered iterates. Equivalently, we can model the stochastic gradient by
vˆ
(i)
t = vi(Xt) + ξ
(i)
t+1, (1)
where (ξ
(i)
t )t∈N be a R
Di-valued F-martingale difference sequence, i.e. it is F-adapted, in the sense that ξt is Ft-
measureable for all t ∈ N, and that its members are conditionally mean zero, in the sense that E[ξt|Ft−1] = 0, for all
t ∈ N. If we work with the whole population, we use the following notations:
v : X → RD, x 7→ (vi(x(i), x(−i)))i∈[N ], and ξt := (ξ(i)t )i∈[N ]
Mirror Map - Realizing Action in the constraint set The following gives the map which allows the agents to
project the iterate based on first-order informations to their individual constraint sets:
Definition 1 (Regularizer/penalty function and Mirror Map): Let Z be a compact convex subset of a normed space
(RM , ‖ · ‖), and K > 0. We say ψ : Z → R is a K-strongly convex regularizer (or penalty function) on Z , if ψ
is continuous and K-strongly convex on Z . The mirror map Φ : (RM , ‖ · ‖∗) → Z induced by ψ is defined by:
Φ(y) := argmaxx∈Z {〈y, x〉 − ψ(x)}
Clearly, the mirror map is a generalization of the usual Euclidean projection. An interesting example of mirror maps
is the so-called logit choice Φ(y) = exp(y)/
∑D
l=1 exp(yl) which is generated by the 1-strongly convex regularizer
ψ(x) =
∑D
k=1 xk log xk on the probability simplex ∆ ⊂ (RD, ‖ · ‖1). Throughout this work, we assume that
each agent i ∈ [N ] possess a Ki-strongly convex regularizer ψi which induces the mirror map Φi, and the Fenchel
coupling Fi. In order to emphasize the action of the whole population, we use the operator Φ : R
D+R → X ,
y 7→ (Φ1(y(1)), . . . ,ΦN (y(N))) and the total Fenchel coupling F : X × RD , (x, y)→
∑N
i=1 Fi(xi, yi).
Online Mirror Descent The foundation of the investigations made in this work is given by the following decision-
making model of the agent i ∈ [N ]:
X
(i)
t+1 = Φi(Y
(i)
t+1), Y
(i)
t+1 = Y
(i)
t + γtvˆ
(i)
t , γt > 0 (2)
(2) is a canonical extension (see [19]) of the online mirror descent algorithm [3] to multi-agent competitive system. By
writing the recursion in (2) explicitly, we obtain Y
(i)
t+1 = Y
(i)
0 +
∑t
τ=0 γτ vˆ
(i)
τ , and consequently see that the decision
3
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of agent i results in this context from action-scoring process by averaging the historical direction of the steepest ascent
of her utility, whereby the aspect of "action-scoring" is best seen in the case Xi is the probability simplex and Φi is the
logit choice.
2.3 Nash Equilibrium and Variational Inequality
One of the central concept in game theory is the so-called Nash equilibrium (NE) which denotes a feasible population
strategy profile at which no agent can improve his reward by unilaterally deviating from his strategy. Besides the
aspect that a NE gives a solution and thus a prediction of the decisions of rational agents in a competitive one-shot
environment, it has the potential to be an equilibrium in the repeated NG setting with first-order feedback. Key to the
understanding of this statement is the following equivalent concept:
Definition 2 (Variational Inequality (VI)): Let Z be a subset of a finite dimensional normed space (RM , ‖ · ‖), and
suppose that F : Z → (RM , ‖ · ‖∗). A point x ∈ Z is a solution of the variational inequality VI(Z, F ), if
〈x− x, F (x)〉 ≤ 0, for all x ∈ Z . The set of solution of VI(Z, F ) is denoted by SOL(Z, F ).
By "equivalent", we mean specifically that SOL(X , v) coincides with the NE of Γ (see e.g. Corollary 1 in [24]). The
definition of VI asserts that the agents gradients points toward SOL(X , v) and therefore (2) converges (under certain
condition on the learning rate) to SOL(X , v) [19]. However elements of SOL(X , v) do not necessarily satisfies the
resource constraints Q. Consequently we cannot expect resource sustainability behaviour of the population applying
(2).
In order to handle this issue one may consider instead SOL(Q, v), which is non-empty sinceQ is convex and compact
and v is monotone, and tries to ensure (2) (possibly by some modifications) to converges to this set. This procedure is
the basic of our approach.
3 Price Mechanism
In order to give the agents incentives for sustainable use of resources, our advice is to charge each agent additional cost
for the amount of utilization of resources related to her action. Specifically, consider a time slot t, agent i is obligate
to pay Λ˜Tt AiX
(i)
t+1 for a possible future action X
(i)
t+1 ∈ Xi, where Λ˜t is a vector specifying the price of each resource
at time t. So at time t, the utility function of agent i becomes u
(i)
t (·) + Λ˜Tt Ai(·), and correspondingly assuming that
the price information is not noisy, the gradient update (2) turns to:
Y
(i)
t+1 = Y
(i)
t + γt(vˆ
(i)
t +A
T
i Λ˜t). (3)
The update of each entry of the price vector Λ˜t+1 is done by each of the resources separately proportional to their own
congestion state. The specific mechanism is provided in Algorithm 1.
The parameter βτ specifies to what extent the price of a resource should be considered in the decision-making process
of the agents. In order to understand the effect of this parameter to the population dynamic, let us consider the extreme
cases βτ = 0 and high βτ > 0. With βτ = 0, the population dynamic described in Algorithm 1 turns to (2). As already
outlined in Subsection 2.3, we cannot expect decaying resource congestion. Now, if βτ > 0 is high, the agents tend
to take the action with cheapest cost. Since the price of a resource is proportional to its congestion state, all agents
might at worst (e.g. in the case N = D and Ai = IN , where an action corresponds directly to resource utilization
choice) fully consume a single resource with the lowest congestion and cause therefore the latter’s price and load
to rise dramatically. Subsequently in the next time slot, they will all mutually fully utilized another less congested
and cheaper resource causing its price and congestion to rise dramatically. This procedure will repeat, cause agents’
consumption choice bounces at worst from a single resource to another one, and meanwhile violation of resource
capacity constraints. This gedankenexperiment asserts in particular that high prices and thus high degree of control,
in contrary to the intuition, does in general not support sustainable behaviour. Rather, one should allow for the latter’s
sake to a certain degree egoistic behaviour of the agents.
The parameter ητ specifies the strength of the dependency of the price update on the previous price. ηt = 1 corresponds
to the extreme case where the price update only based on the actual congestion state φrt . We expect ητ = 1 is not
a good choice since it ignores the price dynamic and correspondingly the agents’ consumption behaviour implicitly
described therein. A problem which might occur with the extreme case ητ = 0 is the rapid increase of the prices
causing the price update insensitive against changes in the congestion state of the resources.
4
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Algorithm 1
Require: Horizon length T ,
• For each t ∈ [T −1]0: agents’ learning rate γτ > 0, resources’ learning rate ζτ ∈ (0, 1), price progressivity
ητ ≥ 0, price sensitivity βτ ≥ 0,
• Initialization: Score vectors Y (i)0 ∈ RDi , i ∈ [N ], prices Λr0 ∈ R≥0, r ∈ [R].
//Mechanism
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
Every agent i ∈ [N ] mutually playX(i)t ← Φi(Y (i)t )
//Decision making via Online Learning
for every player i ∈ [N ] do
Observe noisy gradient utility feedback (1) and update the score vector Y
(i)
t+1 via (3)
Query the prices Λ˜rt from the resources r ∈ [R]
end for
//Pricing
for every resource r ∈ [R] do
Check the actual own congestion state: φrt = φ
r(Xt) = [AXt − b]r
Update the price: Λrt+1 ← [(1− ηt)Λrt + ζtφrt ]+ and Λ˜rt+1 ← βt · Λrt+1
end for
end for
4 Non-asymptotic Guarantee of the Price Mechanism
In this section we provide a theoretical analysis of the price mechanism provided in Algorithm 1. Our emphasize is on
the degree of its contribution to the resource-aware consumption behaviour of the agents, which we measured by the
(time) average of the norm of the clipped cumulative violation of constraints (ANCCVC):
ANCCVCt :=
E
[
‖[
∑t−1
t=0(AXt−b)]+‖2
]
t , t ∈ N.
ANCCVC gives in particular an estimate for the time average congestion state of the resource since ANCCVCt ≥∑t−1
τ=0 φr(Xτ )/t for all r ∈ [R].
Throughout,C1, C2, C3 denote non-negative constants fulfilling for all x ∈ X and λ ∈ RM≥0:
‖ATλ‖∗ ≤ C1‖λ‖2, ‖v(x)‖∗ ≤ C2, ‖g(x)‖2 ≤ C3, (4)
which clearly exists by our assumptions on u and X . Our main result is the following:
Theorem 1: Given a horizon length t ∈ N and learning rate γτ > 0, τ ∈ [t− 1]0. Set the extrinsic price sensitivity of
the agents as βτ = 2 and ζτ = γτ , for all τ ∈ [t− 1]0 and suppose that for all τ ∈ [t− 1]0 the agents’ learning rate
and the price progressivity fulfills:
η2τ − ητ4 + γ
2
τC
2
1
4K ≤ 0 (Trackability Condition (TC)), (5)
Then it holds for Λ0 = 0 and Y0 = 0:
E
[
‖[
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (AXτ − b)]+‖22
]
≤ 2ηt
(
∆ψ + C˜1
t−1∑
τ=0
γ2τ
)
+ η2t
(
C˜22 +
4
K
t∑
τ=1
γ2τ−1E[‖ξτ‖2∗]
)
, (6)
where:
ηt :=
t−1∑
τ=0
ητ + 1, C˜1 := 2
(
C22
K + 2C
2
3
)
, ∆ψ =
N∑
i=1
(
max
Xi
ψi −minXi ψi
)
, K := min
i
Ki,
and C˜2 > 0 is a constant independent of t, the choice of mirror maps Φi, i ∈ [N ], and the noises (ξτ )τ∈[T ].
The proof of this theorem is rather technical and is provided in Appendix B. It is based on the analysis of the dynamic of
the energy function Et((x, λ), λ˜) := E1t ((x, λ))+E2t (λ˜)where E1t ((x, λ)) := F (x, Yt)+ ‖Λt−λ‖
2
2
2 , E2t (λ˜) := ‖Λt−λ˜‖
2
2
2 ,
x ∈ X , and λ, λ˜ ∈ RR. We use as the reference point for E1t the strategy x ∈ SOL(Q, v). Such x possesses desired
5
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sustainable property and attracts Xt (see Subsection 2.3). The latter is ensured by additionally choosing λ as the dual
point in the KKT-system of SOL(Q, v). E2t with suitable λ˜ provide more specific information about the norm of the
clipped weighted cumulative resource congestion.
The energy function Et contrasts to that used in [19] which is F (x, Yt). Furthermore, notice that since the dual
constraint space RR≥0 is not compact, E1t is not merely a trivial extension of the energy function F (x, Yt) used in [19]
yielding by seeing the dual variable as a new player. Furthermore, the energy function E1t is used in the literature of the
constrained online optimization [25]. In the game setting, it seems necessary to involve the additional energy function
E2(Λt, λ˜) and set the price sensitivity to 2 in order to obtain the bound given in above theorem.
On Trackability Condition: In order that (5) is fulfilled at a time τ , it is necessary that η2τ−(ητ/4) < 0. Therefore, the
requirement (5) demands that ητ < 1/4. This observation gives the advice to the resources not to be fully progressive
in the price determination , i.e. to avoid the parameter ητ ≈ 1. By attempting to solve the quadratic inequality (5) one
can see that a necessary condition on γτ s.t. (5) holds at time τ is γ ≤ 14C1
√
K
2 In this case, (5) is equivalent to:
1
4−
√
1
16−
γ2τC
2
1
K
2 ≤ ητ ≤
1
4+
√
1
16+
γ2τC
2
1
K
2 .
This observation assert that for small γτ , one can choose ητ approximately in the interval (0, 1/4).
Remark 1: Suppose that γτ = Cγτ
−p for a certain Cγ and p > 0, and ητ = Cητ−q for a certain Cη > 0 and q > 0.
In order that TC holds, it is necessary that ητ decays with the same order like or slower than γ
2
τ . Therefore we have to
require q ∈ (0, 2p].
Now we are ready to give several consequences of Theorem (1). For simplicity, we assume that the noise is persistent,
in the sense that E[‖ξτ‖2∗] ≤ σ2∗, for all τ ∈ N.
Constant Learning rate: Let us consider a finite time horizon T ∈ N and βτ = 2, for all τ ∈ [T − 1]0. Furthermore,
let us consider the case where both, the learning rate of the agents and the price progressivity are constant, i.e. γτ = γ
and ητ = η, for all τ ∈ [T − 1]0. Assuming that γ and η fulfills (5) holds, it follows from (6) and Jensen’s inequality:
E[ANCCVCT ] ≤
√
2(ηT+1)
γT 2
(
∆ψ
γ + C˜1γT
)
+ (ηT+1)
2
γ2T 2 C˜
2
2 +
(ηT+1)2
T 2
4σ2∗T
K . (7)
So, suppose that γ = Θ(T−p) with p ∈ [1/2, 1). Setting η = Θ(T−q) where q ∈ (1/2, 2p], it yields:
E[ANCCVCT ] ≤ O
(
T p−
q+1
2 + T p−q + σ∗T
1
2−q
)
. (8)
In particular if p = 1/2, we can choose q = 1 and obtain a sub-linear bound for the ANCCVC at time T of order
O((1 + σ∗)T− 12 ).
Variable Parameters: If the agents are each willing to apply the ergodic average of their historical strategies instead
of their actual strategies, we can ensure the decay of the violation of resource constraints with time in expectation. In
order to show this, let us consider the infinite time horizon T =∞. We use Jensen’s inequality to obtain the following
bound from (6):
E
[
‖[
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (AXτ − b)]+‖2
]
≤
√√√√2ηt
(
∆ψ + C˜1
t−1∑
τ=0
γ2τ
)
+ η2t
(
C˜22 +
4σ2∗
K
t−1∑
τ=0
γ2τ
)
, ∀t ∈ N
For the ergodic averageX
γ
t =
∑t−1
τ=0 γτXτ∑t−1
τ=0 γτ
of the population iterate, we have:
E
[
‖[AXγt − b]+‖2
]
≤
√√√√2ηt(∆ψ+C˜1∑t−1τ=0 γ2τ)+η2t
(
C˜22+
4σ2∗
K
∑t−1
τ=0 γ
2
τ
)
∑t−1
τ=0 γt
,
Setting γt = Θ(t
−1/2) and ηt = Θ(t−1) fulfilling trackability condition, it follows that the decay of the congestion
state is in the noiseless case of order O(ln(t)/√t) and otherwise O(ln3/2(t)/√t). Now let be γt = Θ(t−1) and
ηt = Θ(t
−2), we have decay of orderO((1 + σ∗)/ ln(t)).
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Figure 1: Dynamic of ANCCVC of Algorithm 1 for different price sensitivities β and - progressivities η = αγ2
5 Numerical Experiment
Exponential Weights Online Learning in Quadratic Game: We consider N agents whose task is to allocate
a certain amount of tasks to R resources. The strategy space of agent i corresponds to the simplex ∆ :={
x(i) ∈ RR≥0 :
∑R
r=1 x
(i)
k = 1
}
. For a strategy x(i) ∈ ∆, x(i)r stands for the proportion of tasks agent i assigns to
resource r ∈ [R]. The cost function of player i is quadratic and given by J (i)(x(i), x(−i)) = 12 〈x(i), Qx(i)〉+〈Cσ(x)+
ci, x(i)〉, where σ(x) = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
(i) where ci ∈ RD , Q ∈ RD×D and C ∈ RD×D are positive semi-definite, and
either Q or C are positive definite. In order to apply our method, we set u(i)(x) = −J (i)(x). The corresponding
gradient mapping is given by v(x) = − [(IN ⊗Q+ 1N 1N1TN ⊗ C)x+ c+ 1N (IN ⊗ CT)x], where ⊗ denotes the
Kronecker product between two matrices. For the mirror map of the agents, we use the logit choice implemented by
means of log-sum trick in order to avoid numerical overflow.
Game Parameter: We consider N = 20, D = R = 5, and T = 500, and study the case where parameters are fixed.
We setQ = 2
√
Q˜TQ˜+ ID, where the entries of Q˜ is chosen independently normal distributed. Moreover we consider
the case where C = 4ID, c = 0, A = 41
T
N ⊗ ID, and b = 161D. For specific model of the stochastic feedback we
use Gaussian vector with covariance matrix σ2ID, where σ > 0.
Evaluation: For the experiments each depicted in Figures 1a, 1b, and 2a we use different realization of the noise with
same power σ = 5. Figure 1a shows that pure egoistic uncontrolled behaviour of the agents (β = 0) may lead to
immense overuse of the resources, and that control of agents’ consumption via price mechanism (β > 0) can prevent
this event. With price regularization (β > 0), we observe the tendency of oscillation in the agents’ dynamic, whereby
the following difference is observable: The choices β = 1 and β = 2 effect in stabilizing behaviour, while β = 3 and
β = 4 effect in chaotic behaviour. This observations are aligned with the gedankenexperiment done in Section 3, one
of whose conclusions is that high price sensitivity might cause the agents’ utilization strategies to mutually bouncing
between single resources. Furthermore, Figure 1a confirms the optimality of the selection of parameter choice β = 2
given in Theorem 1, since it tends to have the lowest ANCCVC. From Figure 1b, we can observe that in the non-
progressive case α = 0 (η = αγ2 = 0), the corresponding dynamic of ANCCVC resonates heavily and possess at the
end of the time-horizon (t = 500) highest value (aside from α = 50). This asserts the importance of progressivity in
the price determination and also justifies the importance of the TC (5). The parameters α = 1 and α = 10 has the
best behaviour in this experiment. We see the tendency of decreasing oscillation with increasing price progressivity.
However by observing α = 10 the overall performance at the end of the time horizon might be worse for high η. This
observation underlines the role of η as the parameter specifying the decay rate of ANCCVC asserted by the bound
(7). From Figure 2a the high oscillatory chaotic behaviour of γ = 1/
√
T and γ = 10/
√
T is aligned with the TC (5)
which eliminate the possibility that for fixed η, γ can be arbitrarily high. Moreover the plot for γ = 0.05/
√
T shows
that too small γ caused slow decay of the ANCCVC as predicted by the bound (7).
Figure 2b shows that the noise power has no significant influence to the ANCCVC. This observation is somehow
forecasted by our theoretical results since the noise term in the corresponding expectation bound decay with square
roots of the time and the noise is light-tailed.
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Figure 2: Dynamic of ANCCVC of Algorithm 1 for different learning rates γ and noise powers σ.
6 Concluding Remarks
Although machine learning methodology becomes evermore present in the modern technology and thus in our increas-
ingly technologized daily life, most of the learning literature only concern with the optimal behaviour of a single
learner independently from the possible impact of her decision. Motivated by this issue and everlasting resource
scarcity problem, we took a game-theoretic macroscopic view of the online learning paradigm and extended the re-
sulted model by concerning possible impact of the learners’ decision to the scarce resources. This allowed us to design
a control method via decentralized pricing which provides the learners incentives for sustainable behaviour. In the best
case we can ensure the decay of the time average accumulation of the resource congestion of order O(T−1/2) with
time horizon T , which also holds in expectation in case that the learners have noisy first-order feedback. Moreover
if the online learners are willingly to apply the ergodic average - instead of their OMD-based strategy itself, we can
ensure in the best case the decay of the resource congestion with time t of orderO(ln(t)/√t) in the noiseless case and
in expectation of orderO(1/ ln(t)).
Nevertheless, there are several interesting questions remains open such as: whether the guarantees holds also with
high probability; whether the quality of the pricing mechanism remains, if asynchronity in the agent update holds, be
it in the choice of learning rate, or in the update time, or if mismatch between resources’ - and agents’ learning rate.
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B Proof of the Theorem 1
The energy function F (x, Yt) is used in the literature of multi-agent online learning (see e.g. [19]). As done in [19] by
analyzing the dynamic of F (x∗, Yt), x∗ ∈ SOL(v,X ) is a candidate for a population strategy, to which the multi-agent
OMD iterate Xt given by (2) converges.
Following this approach, we analyze in the following F (x∗, Yt), where x∗ ∈ SOL(v,Q). If it then turns out that Xt
converges to x∗, we can be sure that at least Xt asymptotically fulfills the resource constraints which aligns with our
aim. Toward this end, we have:
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Lemma 2: For all t ∈ N and x ∈ X , it holds for V(1)t (x) := F (x, Yt)− F (x, Y0):
V(1)t (x) ≤
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ 〈Xτ − x, v(Xτ )〉 −
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ 〈Xτ − x, βτATΛτ 〉
+
t−1∑
τ=0
β2τγ
2
τC
2
1
K ‖Λτ‖22 + St(x) + 2KRt +
2C22
∑t−1
τ=0 γ
2
τ
K ,
where C1 and C2 are given in (4), and where:
St(x) :=
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ 〈Xτ − x, ξτ+1〉, Rt :=
t−1∑
τ=0
γ2τ‖ξτ+1‖2∗.
Since Xτ is not necessarily in Q, it is not yet obvious that Xt receive negative drift toward x∗ ∈ SOL(v,Q)
(SOL(v,Q) 6= ∅ since v is monotone and Q is compact) by observing the term 〈Xτ − x∗, v(Xτ )〉. In order to
adress this issue, we express SOL(v,Q) equivalently in the higher space RD × RR by means of Lagrangian method.
Usual KKT argumentation give the following statement:
Proposition 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. x ∈ Q is a solution of VI(Q, v)
2. There exists λ ∈ RR≥0 s.t. (x, λ) is a solution of VI(X × RR≥0, v˜), where:
v˜ : X × RR≥0 → RD+R, (x, λ) 7→
[
v(x) −ATλ
Ax− b
]
. (9)
In order to benefit from above proposition, we now analyze the dynamic of the energy function ‖Λt − λ‖22:
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Lemma 4: For all t ∈ N and λ ∈ RR≥0, it holds for V(2)t (λ) := (‖Λt − λ‖22 − ‖Λ0 − λ‖22):
V(2)t (λ) ≤
t−1∑
τ=0
ζτ 〈Λτ − λ,AXτ − b〉+
t−1∑
τ=1
(
2η2τ − ητ2
) ‖Λτ‖22 + ‖λ‖22 t−1∑
τ=0
ητ
2 + 2C
2
3
t−1∑
τ=0
ζ2τ . (10)
Combining the previous bounds for V(1)t (x) and V(2)t (λ), it yields for z = (x, λ) ∈ X × Λ:
Vt(z) ≤−
t−1∑
τ=0
γτΘτ (z) +
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (1− βτ )〈Xτ − x,ATΛτ 〉+ 2C
2
2
K
t−1∑
τ=1
γ2τ + 2C
2
3
t−1∑
τ=1
ζ2τ
+ ‖λ‖22
t−1∑
τ=0
ητ
2 +
t−1∑
τ=0
(
2η2τ −
ητ
2
+
β2τγ
2
τC
2
1
K
)
‖Λτ‖22 + St(x) + 2KRt
+
t−1∑
τ=0
(γτ − ζτ )〈Λτ − λ,AXτ − b〉,
where Vt(z) = V(1)t (x) + V(2)t (λ), and where:
Θt(z) := 〈z − Zt, v˜(Zt)〉.
By straightforward computation one can show that v monotone asserts v˜ is monotone. Thus it holds:
Θt(z) ≥ 〈z∗ − Zt, v˜(z∗)〉 ≥ 0, ∀z∗ ∈ SOL(X × RR≥0, v˜).
This and the choice ζτ = γτ yields for z∗ = (x∗, λ∗) ∈ SOL(X × RR≥0, v˜) :
Vt(z∗) ≤
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (1− βτ )〈Xτ − x∗,ATΛτ 〉+ 2C
2
2
K
t−1∑
τ=1
γ2τ + 2C
2
3
t−1∑
τ=1
ζ2τ
+ ‖λ∗‖22
t−1∑
τ=0
ητ
2 +
t−1∑
τ=0
(
2η2τ −
ητ
2
+
β2τγ
2
τC
2
1
K
)
‖Λτ‖22 + St(x∗) + 2KRt
(11)
To eliminate the first summand in above bound, we continue:
Lemma 5: It holds for all λ ≥ 0:
〈Λτ − λ,AXτ − b〉 ≤ 〈Xτ − x˜,ATΛτ 〉 − 〈λ,AXτ − b〉,
where x˜ ∈ Q arbitrary.
Setting this observation into (10) and setting the choice ζτ = γτ , it yields for any x˜ ∈ Q:
V(2)t (λ) ≤
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ 〈Xτ − x˜,ATΛτ 〉 −
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ 〈λ,AXτ − b〉
+
t−1∑
τ=1
(
2η2τ − ητ2
) ‖Λτ‖22 + ‖λ‖22 t−1∑
τ=0
ητ
2 + 2C
2
3
t−1∑
τ=0
γ2τ
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For z∗ = (x∗, λ∗) λ∗ ≥ 0, and for λ˜ ≥ 0, it holds by combining above inequality (with x˜ = x∗) and (11):
Vt(z∗) + V(2)t (λ˜) ≤−
(
〈λ˜,
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (AXτ − b)〉 − ηt
2
‖λ˜‖22
)
+
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (2− βτ )〈Xτ − x,ATΛτ 〉+
(
4η2τ − ητ +
β2τγ
2
τC
2
1
K
) t−1∑
τ=0
‖Λτ‖22
+ 2
(
C22
K + 2C
2
3
) t−1∑
τ=0
γ2τ + ‖λ∗‖22
t−1∑
τ=0
ητ
2 + St(x∗) +
2
KRt.
The second summand is eliminated by the choice βτ = 2 and the third summand by the trackability condition. Thus it
follows:
Vt(z∗) + V(2)t (λ˜) ≤−
(
〈λ˜,
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (AXτ − b)〉 − ηt
2
‖λ˜‖22
)
+ 2
(
C22
K + 2C
2
3
) t−1∑
τ=0
γ2τ
+ ‖λ∗‖22
t−1∑
τ=0
ητ
2 + St(x∗) +
2
KRt.
(12)
Now, since Λ0 = 0, one sees that V(2)t (λ˜) ≥ −‖λ˜‖22/2. Moreover since Λ0 = 0 and Y0 = 0, we have Vt(z∗) ≥−∆ψ(X )− (‖λ∗‖22/2). Combining those observations with (12), we obtain:[
〈λ˜,
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (AXτ − b)〉 −
∑t−1
τ=0 ητ+1
2 ‖λ˜‖22
]
≤∆ψ(X ) + 2
(
C22
K + C
2
3
) t−1∑
τ=1
γ2τ
+
(
∑t−1
τ=0 ητ+1)
2 ‖λ∗‖22 + St(x∗) + 2KRt.
(13)
Since:
sup
λ˜≥0
(
〈λ˜,
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (AXτ − b)〉 −
∑t−1
τ=0 ητ + 1
2
‖λ˜‖22
)
= 1
2(
∑t−1
τ=0 ητ+1)
∥∥∥∥∥
[
t−1∑
τ=0
γτ (AXτ − b)
]
+
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
Setting the optimizing λ˜ ≥ 0 into (13), taking the expectation of the resulted inequality, and noticing that E[Sn(x∗)] =
0, since Sn(x∗) is a martingale with E[S1(x∗)] = 0, we obtain the desired statement with C˜2 > 0 a constant satisfying
‖λ∗‖22
C Proofs
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2): Let be τ ∈ [t]0. By means of the bound for the Fenchel coupling of the one step difference
given in (17), we obtain:
F (x, Yτ+1) ≤ F (x, Yτ ) + γτ 〈Xτ − x, v(Xτ )− βτATΛτ 〉+ γτ 〈Xτ − x, ξτ+1〉
+
1
2K
‖γτ (v(Xτ ) + ξτ+1)− γτβτATΛτ‖2∗.
Triangle inequality and the inequality (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2) gives:
‖γτ (v(Xτ ) + ξτ+1)− γτβτATΛτ‖2∗ ≤ 2γ2τ‖(v(Xτ ) + ξτ+1)‖2 + 2γ2τβ2τ‖ATΛτ‖2∗
≤ 4γ2τ‖v(Xτ )‖2 + 4γ2τ‖ξτ+1‖2 + 2γ2τβ2τ‖ATΛτ‖2∗
≤ 4γ2τC22 + 4γ2τ‖ξτ+1‖2 + 2γ2τβ2τC21‖Λτ‖22
inserting the given iterate at time τ + 1, and applying triangle inequality, it holds
F (x, Yτ+1)− F (x, Yτ ) ≤ γτ 〈Xτ − x, v(Xτ )− βτATΛτ 〉+ γτ 〈Xτ − x, ξτ+1〉
+
γ2τ
K
(
C21β
2
τ‖Λτ‖22 + 2(C22 + ‖ξτ+1‖2∗)
)
.
Summing above over all τ = 0, . . . , t− 1 and subsequent telescoping, we obtain an upper bound
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Proof (Proof of 4): Let be τ ∈ [t]0
‖Λτ+1 − λ‖22 = ‖ΠRR
≥0
((1 − ητ )Λτ + ζτ [AXτ − b])− λ‖22
≤ ‖(1− ητ )Λτ + ζτ [AXτ − b]− λ‖22 = ‖Λτ − λ− ητΛτ + ζτ [AXτ − b]‖22
= ‖Λτ − λ‖22 + 2〈Λτ − λ,−ητΛτ + ζτ [AXτ − b]〉+ ‖ − ητΛτ + ζτ [AXτ − b]‖22
= ‖Λτ − λ‖22 − 2ητ 〈Λτ − λ,Λτ 〉+ ζτ 〈Λτ − λ,AXτ − b〉+ ‖ − ητΛτ + ζτ [AXτ − b]‖22
(14)
Now, triangle inequality and the inequality (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2) gives:
‖ − ητΛτ + ζτ [AXτ − b]‖22 ≤ 2η2τ‖Λτ‖22 + 2ζ2τC23 .
Moreover, we have:
‖λ‖22 = ‖Λτ − λ− Λτ‖22 = ‖Λτ − λ‖22 − 2〈Λτ − λ,Λτ 〉+ ‖Λτ‖22,
and consequently:
−2〈Λτ − λ,Λτ 〉 = ‖λ‖22 − ‖Λτ‖22 − ‖Λτ − λ‖22 ≤ ‖λ‖22 − ‖Λτ‖22
Combining all the observations, we obtain:
‖Λτ+1 − λ‖22 − ‖Λτ+1 − λ‖22 ≤ ζτ 〈Λτ − λ,AXτ − b〉+
(
2η2τ − ητ2
) ‖Λτ‖22 + ητ2 ‖λ‖22 + 2ζ2τC23 .
Summing above over all τ = 0, . . . , t− 1 and subsequent telescoping, we obtain the desired upper bound.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 5): we have for any x ∈ X :
〈Λτ − λ,AXτ − b〉 = 〈Λτ ,AXτ − b〉 − 〈λ,AXτ − b〉
= 〈Λτ ,AXτ −Ax〉 + 〈Λτ ,Ax− b〉 − 〈λ,AXτ − b〉
= 〈Xτ − x,ATΛτ 〉+ 〈Λτ ,Ax− b〉 − 〈λ,AXτ − b〉. (15)
Now, since Λτ ≥ 0, it follows that 〈Λτ ,Ax˜− b〉 ≤ 0, for x˜ ∈ Q. Therefore, if we set x = x˜ with x∗ ∈ Q in (15), we
have from previous observation the desired statement.
D Mirror Map and Fenchel Coupling
Proposition 6: Let F be the Fenchel coupling induced by aK-strongly convex regularizer on a compact convex subset
Z of a Euclidean normed space V . For p ∈ Z , y, y′ ∈ V∗, we have:
F (p, y) ≥ (K/2)‖Φ(y)− p‖2 (16)
F (p, y
′
) ≤ F (p, y) + 〈Φ(y)− p, y′ − y〉+ (1/2K)‖y′ − y‖2∗ (17)
For a proof, see e.g. Proposition 4.3 (c) in [19]
E Decoupling the Coupled Constraints by means of Lagrangian Method
In order to investigate VI(Q, v), it is convenient to extend VI(Q, v) to VI(X × RR≥0, v˜), where v˜ : X × RR≥0,
v˜ : X × RR≥0 → RD+R, (x, λ) 7→
[
v(x)−ATλ
Ax− b
]
. (18)
The advantage of this method is the decoupling of the constraint set. Specifically, by means of this procedure, we only
have to work with the constraint set X × RM≥0 with product structure rather than with Q.
Usual KKT argumentation asserts that VI(Q, v) and VI(X × RM+ , v˜) is essentially the same in the following sense:
Proposition 7: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. x ∈ Q is a solution of VI(Q, v)
2. There exists λ ∈ RR≥0 s.t. (x, λ) is a solution of VI(X × RR≥0, v˜).
A proof of this statement is provided in Appendix F. Proposition 7 tell us that in order to find a variational Nash
equilibrium of Γ (in case it exists), it is sufficient to find the solution of VI(X × RR≥0, v˜).
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F KKT-System for Variational Inequality
Let beM,D ∈ N. We consider the problem:
max
x∈D
f(x) s.t. g(x) ≤ 0, (19)
where f : D → R, and g : D → RM continuously differentiable and D is a non-empty subset of RD. We define
Z := {x ∈ D : g(x) ≤ 0}. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system corresponding to (19) is defined as:
∇f(x)−∇g(x)Tλ = 0
0 ≤ λ ⊥ g(x) ≤ 0
x ∈ D (20)
Definition 3 (Slater constraint qualification): The set Z is said to satisfy Slater’s constraint qualification if gi is
convex for all i ∈ [M ] and if there exists x∗ ∈ relint(D) s.t. g(x∗) < 0.
The following statement gives a relation between a convex optimization problem and its KKT system:
Proposition 8: Suppose that Z satisfies the Slater’s CQ. Then:
1. If x solves (19), then there exists λ s.t. (x, λ) solves (20)
2. Assume that f is convex on D. If (x, λ) solves (20) then x solves (19)
The idea of relating constrained convex optimization problem to unconstrained convex optimization problem applies
also to variational inequality. For this sake, we define the notion of KKT system relative to the variational inequality
VI(Z, F ) by:
F (x) − λT∇g(x) = 0
0 ≤ λ ⊥ g(x) ≤ 0
x ∈ Z. (21)
Proposition 9: Suppose that Z satisfies the Slater’s CQ. Then x solves VI(Z, F ) if and only if there exists λ s.t. (x, λ)
solves the KKT system (21)
Proof: x solves VI(Z, F ) if and only if:
〈x, F (x)〉 ≤ 〈x, F (x)〉, ∀x ∈ Z.
In turn, the latter is equivalent with:
x ∈ argmax
x∈Z
〈x, F (x)〉.
The KKT system corresponds to above program is given by (21) (cf. (19)) Since x 7→ 〈x, F (x)〉 is trivially convex on
D, and Z satisfies the Slater’s constraint qualification, then the desired statement follows from Proposition 8.
In order to obtain Proposition 7 all we need is to get rid of the condition λ⊥g(x) in the KKT system for VI (see (21)).
This is done in the following:
Proof (Proof of Proposition 7): Since there are no explicit inequality constraint in X × RR≥0 then X × RR≥0 fulfills
the Slater’s CQ. It follows from Proposition 9 that SOL(X × RR≥0, v˜) coincides with the solution of the KKT system:
v(x) −∇φ(x)λ = 0
φ(x) + µ = 0 (22)
0 ≤ µ ⊥ − λ ≤ 0 (23)
x ∈ X λ ∈ RR≥0. (24)
Setting (22) into (23) we obtain that SOL(X × RR≥0, v˜) coincides with the solution of KKT system:
v(x) −∇φ(x)λ = 0
0 ≤ λ ⊥ φ(x) ≤ 0
x ∈ X . (25)
For the final step, notice that the solution of this KKT system is equivalent to SOL(Q, v) since the Slater’s CQ for Q
is fulfilled.
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